濱田 直斗(九州大学 システム情報科学府 情報学専攻)
鈴木 貴晶(九州大学 システム情報科学研究院)
横尾 真(九州大学 大学院システム情報科学研究院)
|概要||This paper considers an assignment problem of multiple types of goods to agents, |
where each good may have more than one copy
(e.g. multiple seats of a school) but the minimum/maximum
numbers of consumption of each good are constrained, and each agent
initially owns a good (e.g. each student's local school).
In this setting, a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives
with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS) was introduced.
TTCR-SS utilizes a priority order among agents, and it was shown that
it is strategy-proof, individually rational, and Pareto efficient.
In this paper, we further investigate theoretical properties of
TTCR-SS and give a full characterization of the mechanism
by the above three properties, combined with the four natural properties
defined on prioritized agents.
We also show that TTCR-SS satisfies the properties which are
more desirable than strategy-proofness and individual rationality.